technological environment on their stock return volatility. Using three distinct empirical methodologies we detect a significant and corresponding increase in the idiosyncratic and total stock return volatility when a firm initiates eCommerce. Interestingly, this increase in volatility is observed only for firms that moved online post-June 1998, a period when Internet growth reached critical mass. An increase in the implied volatility of at-the-money call options of our sample firms reinforces our findings. We find that this increase in volatility is attributable to changes in the firms' product markets, specifically increased demand uncertainty, resulting from the adoption of a new technology-driven channel. Relevant controls rule out firm-specific characteristics as well as market microstructural factors as possible explanatory variables. We also find that this surge in volatility is accompanied by a positive abnormal return of stock prices. Overall, our results provide strong evidence of the impact of real activity within a firm on its stock return volatility and highlight the importance of understanding changes in firms' technological environment.
Introduction
The last few decades have witnessed significant technological developments, the most recent and the most revolutionary being the advent of the Internet. Financial markets have also been affected by these developments, particularly with technology firms increasingly dominating these markets. For instance, it is widely believed that the dominance of technology firms has made stock market returns more volatile; but the evidence in this regard has been largely circumstantial. Two notable exceptions in this context are the recent work by Schwert (2002) and Campbell et al (2001) . Schwert (2002) identifies 'technological factors' common to computer, biotechnology as well as telecommunication portfolios, rather than firm size or age, as the primary driver of the observed increase in Nasdaq volatility in the post-June 1998 period. Campbell et al (2001) also attribute the significant increase in the idiosyncratic volatility of several industries that they observe, to the emergence of new technologies.
However, what is it about technology that affects firms' volatility, is a question that remains unanswered. This study is an attempt in that direction.
This study seeks to examine the relationship between technological change and changes in a firm's stock return volatility, and also investigate the drivers of these changes. Rather than examining firms in the technology sector, we look at a sample of traditional 'brickand-mortar' firms that have embraced a new technological environment, the Internet, for commerce. The adoption of eCommerce by a traditional firm provides a 'clean' natural experimental setting to examine the impact of changes in a firm's technological environment on its stock return volatility. As we report in detail later, we do find evidence of a definitive and substantial increase in both idiosyncratic as well as total firm volatility when a firm adopts the Internet for commerce. To the best of our knowledge, this is among the first papers to study the relationship between stock return volatility and real activity within the firm. Studying this linkage is important because changes in stock return volatility due to firm-level decisions may affect among other things, the stock valuation, cost of capital, capital structure, the firm's ability to use its stock in acquisitions and pay-for performance policies.
Also, increased volatility could increase risk of default and consequently exacerbate agency problems between stockholders and bondholders. The effects of stock volatility on these issues are clearly of first order importance to the firm's management and stake holders.
How does the adoption of the Internet by traditional firms change their technological environment and where exactly lies the source of increased volatility? To take an extreme example, while a company like Amazon.com (a pure-Internet retailer) is certainly a posterchild for the 'new economy', a traditional book retailer like Barnes and Noble (a good example of the type of firms we study here) is by no means considered a technology-oriented firm.
However, adopting a technological channel like the Internet for commerce, catapults a traditional firm like Barnes and Noble into a new environment, with characteristics shared by several 'technology firms'. While the Internet enables traditional firms to complement their existing marketing channels, its impact on firms has been more profound. First and foremost, a traditional firm moving online is faced with a new competitive landscape dominated by online pure-plays 1 like EBay, Amazon.com and E*Trade, to name a few. The Internet also enables traditional firms to offer customized products and services 2 and alters their value creation activities. In addition, lower costs of entry to many businesses and the erosion of the traditional barriers of space and time differentiate the online channel from traditional ones. The intense competition fuelled further by lower search costs for consumers, ease of price comparison, and reduced switching costs, have forced traditional firms moving online to realign their pricing and product positioning strategies (Viswanthan, 2002) . Several traditional firms including books, CDs, grocery, and consumer electronics retailers, as well as brokerages, real-estate and insurance services have reduced their prices in the online channel, faced with competition from Internet firms 3 . Thus, the initiation of eCommerce alters the competencies of conventional firms and portends a transition from a 'low-tech' to a 'high-tech' environment.
As noted by Klein (1977) , changes in technological regime result in greater demand uncer-1 It is pertinent to note here that while online startups ('Internet pure-plays') dominated the early phases of eCommerce, traditional firms have established a significant presence online in several sectors including apparel, books, music, computers, consumer electronics, brokerages (Bakos et al, 2003) , and travel services.
2 P&G, Dell, Mattel, McGraw-Hill, Wells Fargo, and Nike are just a few of the diverse group of firms that have used the Internet to provide highly customized offerings, not available through their traditional channels.
3 Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) find that prices for books and CDs are 9-16% lower online compared to traditional retailers. Brown and Goolsbee (2002) find that term life insurance prices fell by 8-15 percent from 1995 to 1997 due to the growth of online intermediaries.
tainty in the product markets due to a turbulent industry structure and changing consumer tastes. In addition, new technologies trigger rampant experimentation, by both companies and customers and more so in the initial stages of adoption and growth. Rapid technological changes in the automobile industry in 1930's as well as the PC industry in the 1980's have led to periods of industrial turbulence characterized by high entry and exit rates, as well as rapidly falling prices (Mazzucato, 2002) . Just as the 'competence-altering' technological developments in these industries led to market share instability, the adoption of the Internet, a new technology-driven channel, increases turbulence in the product markets of traditional firms. The reconfiguration of existing industry structure by the addition of a new marketing channel to existing ones is thus expected to have a direct impact on the risk-return profile of firms. These effects are more prominent in retailing sectors characterized by thin profit margins. The adoption of eCommerce by traditional firms thus, provides us an excellent setting in which to examine the link between real activity within the firm and stock return volatility, a issue that has received little attention (Schwert, 2002) .
In this paper, we study the effect of initiation of eCommerce by existing 'brick-and-mortar'
retailers on their total as well as idiosyncratic volatilities, after controlling for changes in market volatility. We find a significant and long term increase in both volatility measures associated with firms moving online. More interestingly, we find that this increase in volatility occurs only for firms that moved online after the growth spurt in Internet related activities, post-June 1998 -a phenomenon attributable to financial markets' recognition of the potential of the Internet to impact a traditional firm's business. This post-June 1998 surge in firm-level volatility parallels Schwert's (2002) findings of an increase in market volatility of technology intensive firms after mid-1998.
We use three distinct methodologies to examine the impact of the event on both the total (systematic and idiosyncratic) as well as idiosyncratic volatility of a firm. The first method involves comparing the post-event average volatility ratio to the pre-event average volatility ratio 4 . Using this methodology, we find that firm-level volatility (after controlling for market volatility) increases significantly immediately following the event. The second method applies 4 Volatility ration refers to the ratio of firm volatility to market volatility and is a simple device to control for any changes in firm volatility due to changes in market volatility rather than the event.
the structural break analysis technique of Bai, Lumsdaine and Stock, (1998) 5 to detect a break in the total volatility series around the event. We find that the break occurs around the event date, confirming our earlier results. The third method is a formal volatility event study and closely follows the methodology of Hilliard and Savickas (2000) . This analysis shows that the event of announcing an eCommerce initiative leads to an unambiguous and sharp increase in the idiosyncratic volatility of firms in our sample.
We then examine the source of this increased volatility and also perform a series of robustness checks. We postulate that increased demand uncertainty (stemming from changes to the firm's technological environment) results in uncertain profit opportunities leading to increases in stock return volatility. However, it is possible that that the increase in volatility around the event date that we uncover is related to other firm specific characteristics such as firm size, historical stock price performance and historical volatility, rather than to product market initiatives. In order to control for these effects we construct two matched samples.
The first sample consists of firms matched on size and historical stock price performance while, the second sample has firms matched on size and historical volatility performance.
We examine the volatility behavior of the two matched samples and find that firms in the matched samples do not experience the increase in volatility that we document for our test sample. This suggests that firm specific factors are not likely to be the driving influences of our results.
A large body of empirical literature documents a positive relation between trade size or number of transactions and stock return volatility (See Karpoff, 1987 for a survey). In order to ensure that our results are not simply an artifact of increased trading volume and number of transactions, we compare the post-event to pre-event trading volume and number of transactions, for all the three samples. We find that while all three samples experience similar increases in their trading activity measures over time, their volatility increases are substantially different, as noted earlier. Thus, we conclude that the observed volatility increases in our test sample cannot be attributed to market microstructure variables.
A second robustness check is to use a completely different metric of volatility and see if our results survive. Following Schwert(1990), we use the implied volatility of at-the-money call options as an alternative volatility measure. We track the monthly series of these implied volatilities for firms in our test sample over a period of 4 years around our the event dates.
Many studies have shown that close-to-the-money option prices convey the most information about the expectations of the options market concerning future volatility (Day and Lewis, 1988) . We find that implied volatility increases after the event for firms in our test sample, confirming our earlier results. We substantiate our earlier claim that these volatility increases are driven by increased demand uncertainty in the product markets by an empirical analysis of this relationship. We construct two alternative measures of demand uncertainty (based on quarterly sales data of sample firms in the 1990-2002 period) and find that these measures are strongly associated with increases in stock return volatility. Based on this cumulative evidence, we conclude that increased demand uncertainty in firms' product markets stemming from changes in their technological environment due to eCommerce initiatives is the driving force behind the observed volatility increase.
We also perform a traditional event-study analysis controlling for event-induced variance, and find that the firms under consideration also experience significant positive abnormal returns attributable to their adoption of eCommerce. More interestingly, we find that these positive abnormal returns only for firms that moved online after June 1998, a finding that is similar to the results of our earlier volatility analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature directly related to this study. In section 3, we briefly note the growing importance of eCommerce in today's economy. We state our null and alternative hypotheses and advance economic arguments to support them. Section 4 describes our test data sample. Section 5 describes the empirical methodologies used. Section 6 describes the main results. Section 7 concludes.
Literature Review
Our study is primarily concerned with firm-level (total and idiosyncratic) volatility 6 . Total stock return volatility can basically be decomposed into two components: systematic volatility -the component of volatility that can be explained by common market or industry-specific factors; and unsystematic or firm-level idiosyncratic volatility. Firm-level idiosyncratic volatility, in particular, is important for large holders of individual stocks (who are restricted from diversifying), and arbitrageurs who trade to exploit the mis-pricing of an individual stock. Firm-level volatility is also important for pricing options and in event studies, as the significance of abnormal event-related returns is determined by the volatility of individual stock returns relative to the market or industry (Campbell et al., 2001 ).
As noted by Campbell et al.(2001) , there is surprisingly little research on firm-level volatility, in contrast to research on market volatility. Their study documents a dramatic increase in firm-level idiosyncratic volatility over the last three decades (compared to industry and market volatility), phenomena they believe is attributable to technological changes. However, they highlight the need for a more detailed investigation of the drivers of increased volatility. They also note that most volatility studies present a statistical description rather than a structural economic model. In keeping with these observations, our paper focuses primarily on the impact of firms' adoption of eCommerce, an economically significant event, on total and firm-specific stock volatility. Also, as noted earlier our study complements Schwert (2002) , who finds that the value-weighted portfolio of Nasdaq stocks shows unusually high volatility since mid-1998 7 . Of particular interest, is Schwert's (2002) conclusion that the unusual volatility of large Nasdaq firms since mid-1998 is attributable to the fact that these firms belong to the technology sector, rather than to firm size. Our paper adds to these findings, by identifying changes in firms' product markets (that stem from changes in the firms' technological environment) as being the primary source of the increased volatility.
The results of our study are also in line with the recent findings of Mazzucato (2002) , that stock prices are the most volatile during periods of high market-share instability and radical technological change using data from automobile and Computer industries. Likewise, the adoption of eCommerce with its potential to radically change the technological environment of well-established traditional firms and consequently their product markets, also significantly affects their financial volatility.
Our paper is also closely related to a number of studies that examine the impact of various corporate events on firms' stock return volatility. Clayton et al (2000) analyze the impact of CEO turnover on firm's return volatility and find that forced turnovers lead to greater volatility increases compared to voluntary ones. In contrast to the traditional volatility studies' focus on capital structure or management changes within the firm, our primary concern here is the effect of changes in a firm's product market resulting from changes to its technological environment, on its risk-return profile. Mazzucato and Semmler (1999) consider changes in industry life-cycle in the US auto industry and relate it to stock price volatility.
In particular they relate changes in market shares of firms aggregated at the industry level to the excess volatility implied by a dividend discount model and find them to be correlated.
Another related stream of research is on the interaction between financial structure and product market (real activity) decisions, an issue that has received little attention. Recent theoretical models by Brander and Lewis (1986) , Maksimovic (1990 Maksimovic ( ,1995 , Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) have formalized ways in which industry product markets may be influenced by corporate financial decisions. Phillips(1995), and Chevalier (1994) have also attempted to establish the relationship between financial structure choices of firms and their corresponding product market outcomes at the industry level. Demers and Lewellen (2003) show the marketing benefits of IPO underpricing for a sample of Internet firms. These papers are concerned with the effect of financial decisions on product markets. This paper complements this growing body of literature by providing evidence of the reverse interaction -viz. the influence of product market decisions of firms (the adoption of eCommerce) on their financial structure, more specifically on their stock return volatility . In particular, we use the advent of eCommerce as an unique exogenous event that impacts traditional firms in multiple ways.
The primary issue in the context of asset price volatility relating to the Internet and traditional brick-and-mortar firms, is "excess volatility". Excess volatility is generally defined as the volatility in prices that cannot be explained by the fundamentals alone. It is traditionally considered synonymous with the market irrationality. Shiller (1981) and Black (1986) are two notable papers in this area. A large empirical literature followed and it broadly concludes that volatility is primarily driven by trading. In particular, changes in trading patterns, increasing institutionalization of equity ownership, increase in day-trading, among other factors affecting investors' discount rates are also believed to influence idiosyncratic volatility (Campbell et al, 2001 ). In contrast, this paper argues that fundamental factors such as adoption of a new technology-driven marketing channel, that increase uncertainty in product markets, rather than market microstructure variables, can also lead to increased volatility. This rational explanation for increased volatility has not been empirically analyzed before.
Finally, another related branch of literature is one that studies the impact of information events in the Internet sector on asset prices. Most of the existing studies in this context are returns event-studies i.e., they examine abnormal returns attributable to specific events.
While we find that firms in our sample experience significant positive abnormal returns when they move online, ours is the first study to investigate the impact of moving online on the firms' stock price volatility. Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau (2001) investigate the stock price response to an event in which a firm just changes its name to an Internet related name such as a "dotcom". They find that relative to an Internet matched portfolio, these firms earn, on average, 53% excess returns around the event. A few papers, e.g. Conell and Liu (2000) and Lamont and Thaler (2000) look at the stock price response to equity carveouts where the subsidiary is a public company in the "new economy" (i.e. the Internet sector). They find that in over 10 such cases, the marked to market value of the shares of the subsidiary held by the parent exceeded the entire parent's market value! Ofek and Richardson (2001) provide a comprehensive survey of how the fundamentals and events in the Internet sector impact asset prices. In addition to the common context of eCommerce, our study is related to Ofek and Richardson (2001) to the extent that they investigate, among other areas, (1) volatility of asset prices and (2) response of stock price to information-based events. Our study is also related to Perotti and Rossetto (2000) who theoretically investigate the impact of demand uncertainty in product markets on firm's profits for the purpose of valuation of Internet portal firms as a portfolio of entry options. However, a significant point of departure is that most of the above Internet-related studies focus primarily on 'pure Internet' firms. While the dominance of pure Internet firms in the early phases of eCommerce generated a lot of interest, we believe that the Internet's impact on traditional brick-and-mortar firms is much more profound. Consequently, we study traditional brick-and-mortar retailing firms that have chosen to embrace the Internet as an additional marketing channel for their products and services and the impact of such choices on their risk-return profiles.
The Hypotheses
While several online start-ups failed to live up to the hype, online sales have nevertheless for more that 10% to 12% of sales in categories such as apparels, accessories and toys and as much as 20% to 25% of total sales in categories such as books, music, software and consumer electronics. Also, nearly two-thirds of consumers surveyed had purchased products online in the last 12 months and more importantly, more than half of these purchases would normally have been made in retail outlets.
Although online sales have been growing steadily, the launch of Internet retailing operations may or may not be a significant event for an existing traditional retailer. It can be argued that the revenues from Internet retailing are likely to be just a fraction of the total revenues from retail sales (more so in the early phases of eCommerce). Consequently, shareholders' expected returns and risks may not be significantly affected by a traditional firm's adoption of eCommerce, and the event under consideration may be inconsequential to the stock volatility, at least in the short run. Thus, our Null hypothesis in this study is as follows:
The commencement of eCommerce operations by a traditional firm has no significant impact on its stock return volatility.
While Internet retailing is still in its infancy, it is expected to grow quickly keeping pace with the rapid growth of the Internet and consequently affording new profit opportunities for firms. However, as highlighted earlier online retailing in an emerging technology-driven channel is also fraught with risks. Although the volume of online retailing is small compared to traditional retailing, even a small shift of sales to the online channel in the future is expected to have a very significant impact on the revenues and profitability of traditional firms (Ernst and Young Global Online Retailing, 2001). As noted by Lusch (1995) , retailers usually face a break-even point of 85 to 92 percent of their sales which suggests that even a modest drop in sales volume due to increased competition online, a retailer would incur significant losses.
Thus the adoption of eCommerce places traditional firms in a new and uncertain environment, exposing them to fresh competitive forces 9 . This leads to our alternative hypothesis viz. launching of eCommerce operations is a significant event in a firm's life because (i) it places the firm in a new environment that offers a lot of potential for growth and (ii) it increases risks stemming from increased competition and price-wars. This implies that the adoption of eCommerce should have an immediate impact on stocks' expected returns and risks, as shareholders re-evaluate the firm's risk-return tradeoff.
We thus postulate that adopting a new technology-driven channel and operating in new, unexplored markets is associated with higher uncertainty of product demand. Higher demand uncertainty leads to higher variance of profits and higher perceived risk by the stockholders, resulting in higher volatility of stock returns. A short formal derivation (Refer Appendix A) illustrates how increased demand uncertainty in the product markets leads to a higher volatility of profits.
To sum up, there are two competing hypotheses about the impact of Internet-retailing on the firm's stock price volatility and their resolution is an empirical matter. We use a combination of event study methodology, structural break methodology and the study of event effects on unsystematic volatility to examine this question.
Data
An event in the context of this study is the announcement of an online retailing initiative by a traditional brick-and-mortar firm. The online retailing initiative is defined as the launch of a Web-site that enables consumers to conduct online retail transactions. Thus, we disregard the firms that launched just an informational Web-site without any transaction capabilities. The announcement dates were collected from leading news sources viz. PR Newswire, Business
Wire, Hoover's Online and the Lexis/Nexis database. All the firms included in the sample are those whose stocks are publicly traded and listed on NYSE or NASDAQ. The sample of firms so obtained was further restricted to satisfy several criteria. We excluded all firms which did not have a two years history of publicly listed stock price prior to the event date.
We also omitted firms whose announcements coincided with other events with potentially confounding effect on stock prices, e.g. earnings announcements or announcements about alliances and mergers. Further, since the focus of the study is on business-to-consumer segment of eCommerce activity as the end consumer of the product is clearly defined, we omitted announcements regarding business-to-business eCommerce. Our final sample consists of 166 firms with event dates spread over the years 1995 to 2000. The year-wise breakup of these dates is given in Table I , Panel A. This table shows that event dates are sufficiently spread out over time and that clustering of events is unlikely to be a significant issue in the study. However, two thirds of the firms announced their online initiatives post June 1998. Table I 
Empirical Methodology
In this paper, we use three distinct methodologies to detect if the event under consideration has an impact on firm-specific volatility. The first methodology involves comparing the pre-event and post-event volatilities of stock returns, after controlling for the overall market volatility in the corresponding periods. Next, we use the methodology of Bai, Lumisdaine and Stock (1998) to detect a structural break in the average volatility series. The average volatility 10 Using value weighted return on the index, produced qualitatively similar results series is constructed by taking the cross-sectional average of stock volatilities in event time.
The formal test for structural break uses a Wald statistic to search for the break in the series around event date zero, and is used to confirm the above event-study results. The third methodology is designed to measure the impact of an event on the unsystematic volatility of a firm. Similar to a traditional returns event-study, it involves estimating the parameters of a market model of security returns over an estimation window. The market model is augmented by assuming a parametric model for the evolution of volatility. The estimated parameters are then used over an event window to determine the impact of the event on unsystematic volatility. The following paragraphs describes these different methodologies.
Comparison of pre-event and post-event volatilities
Following the standard event study methodology, we realign the stock returns of the sample firms in event time. We estimate the firm's stock return volatility σ 2 i over two different windows viz. (1) are considered (three months, six months, one year and two years). Market volatility σ 2 m is also estimated over the same two windows. The simplest way to estimate the volatilities is by the sample standard deviation of daily returns over the relevant windows. This method of estimating volatility of returns has been used in a number of studies, e.g. Schwert (1989) . 11 .
Next, we compute the volatility ratio λ, defined as,
The impact of the event on firm volatility, after controlling for any changes in the market volatility, can be studied by comparing the volatility ratio λ over the pre-event and post-event windows. Similar to standard event studies, the firms in the sample are stacked together in 11 French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) consider an alternative estimator for volatility, which adjusts for autocorrelation in returns that includes sum of the products of adjacent returns, and apply it on stock portfolios. As they note, this modification has little effect on their results. However in our case if the autocorrelation of individual stocks is less than -0.5, it causes the volatility estimate to become negative and hence we use the simpler estimator. This effect never happens with portfolio volatility.
event time and the tests are then performed on cross-sectional average λs. This methodology has been used in earlier volatility event studies. For instance, Clayton et al. (2000) use this methodology to examine the impact of CEO turnover on equity volatility 12 .
Any differences in the average λ between the pre-event and post-event windows can be formally examined with a simple t-test or a non parametric Wilcoxon test. In addition, we also confirm our results using a more sophisticated econometric technique viz. the test for the location of structural break in a time series. The methodology for detecting a structural break in a time-series was pioneered by Banerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1992) (BLS1) and Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1998) (BLS2). These papers contain two key observations viz.
(i) that tests can be constructed to determine whether or not a structural break occurred in a given time series, (ii) that confidence intervals can be computed enabling inference about the break date. They demonstrate this for both stationary vector autoregressions and cointegrated systems. The details of this methodology are provided in Appendix B.
Under our null hypothesis, there should be no structural break in the total volatility series around the event date, while such a break will be expected under the alternative hypothesis.
In order to conduct this test, we calculate a time series of average monthly volatility,(defined as the sample standard deviation of daily returns over the relevant month) for two years prior to and after the event date. The firm volatilities are then averaged cross-sectionally for each month in event-time. The BLS methodology is then used to identify a structural break in the average volatility series.
Event Induced Unsystematic Volatility
We also study the event's effect on the firm's unsystematic volatility using the methodology proposed in Hilliard and Savickas (2002) (hereafter HS). HS specify a market model for security returns, to separate the systematic and unsystematic components of volatility. They postulate the following diffusion processes for the instantaneous market return m and its 12 The volatilities themselves may be estimated in alternative ways. One possible approach is to use option implied volatilities. Mayhew (1995) reviews event studies which use implied volatility. We present results using implied volatility later. Another possible approach to volatility estimation is to use a parametric technique like GARCH. We also repeated our analysis using GARCH(1,1) volatilities with very similar results.
and Corr(dZ m , dZ vm ) = 0. The instantaneous security return p of a firm is given by the market model, dp
where
The estimation of model parameters follow traditional event studies. Unlike the usual return models, the estimation of above volatility models is complicated by two factors (a) the volatilities are unobserved and (b) the models are in continuous time, while the data are observed in discrete time. HS overcome these problems by using a discrete stochastic volatility model (a filter) that converges to the above continuous model as time interval shrinks to zero. Their filter is based on the general result in Nelson and Foster (1994) who show that the optimal filter for the diffusion,
and
is, Nelson and Foster (1994) prove that the discrete time model in (5) converges in distribution to the continuous time model in (4) as ∆ shrinks to zero. The discrete equations above can be written as the following GARCH(1,1) model,
The parameters of the GARCH model over a window can be easily estimated using the method of maximum likelihood. Based on these estimates, we can then derive the estimates of the parameters of the original diffusion process.
Following the above methodology, we first estimate the parameters of the diffusion process (2) for market returns over the estimation window. We then estimate the parameters of the continuous time market model for each firm (3). The betas in (3) are estimated separately by running OLS regression of firm's returns on the market returns over the estimation window.
The second part of this methodology involves hypotheses testing over the event window using parameter estimates from the estimation window. HS introduce a parameter, the multiplicative abnormal volatility to measure the impact of a given event on unsystematic volatility V ε .(To avoid notational confusion we use ψ instead of the λ used by HS). The parameter ψ measures the multiple by which unsystematic volatility increases from its no event level, due to the event. Thus, if ψ = 1, the event has no effect on V ε ; ψ > 1 implies a volatility increase due to the event and ψ < 1 implies a volatility decrease due to the event. A particular event may have a different value of ψ for each day in the event window which is denoted by a time subscript t on ψ. HS show that the estimate of ψ t for each day t in the event window can be obtained by computing the cross-sectional variance of the standardized GARCH(1,1) residuals, η t in equation (6). The cumulative abnormal volatility Cψ k,m between event days k and m is the sum of daily abnormal volatilities over these days.
As HS illustrate, the null hypothesis regarding the effects of an event on volatility can be expressed in terms of either ψ t or Cψ k,m . In terms of ψ t , it is,
and, in terms of Cψ k,m , it is,
HS show that this hypothesis (8) can be tested using a test statistic s t ≡ (N − 1) ψ t which is distributed χ 2 N −1 under the null. Similarly, hypothesis (9) can be tested using the test statistic Cs k,m ≡ (N − 1) Cψ k,m which is distributed χ 2 (N −1)(m−k+1) under the null. If the observed value of the test statistic exceeds the critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected and we can conclude that the event has a statistically significant (daily or cumulative) impact on the (daily or cumulative) unsystematic volatility of stock returns.
Results

Comparison of pre-event and post-event volatilities
First we present the results of our analysis using the simple methodology of comparing the pre-event and post-event volatility ratios λ ≡
. We use the pre-event and post-event windows of 3 months, six months, one year and two years. The resulting pre-event and post-event average λś are reported in Table II , Panel (A). It is interesting to note that the average λ jumps significantly from pre-event to post-event period. The ratio of post-event to pre-event average λ's varies between 1.28 to 1.07. The jump is statistically significant at the 1% level using a standard t-test and a wilcoxon test. This indicates that moving online is associated with a significant volatility increase. We then split the sample into two parts, one with event dates prior to June 1998 and the other with event dates post June 1998. The analysis of the two split samples is presented in Table II Figure 1A illustrates the growth of Web-sites over the past several years 13 . We observe an exponential growth in the number of Web-sites in the post-June 1998 period. The difference between the two periods is also seen in Figure 1B which shows the evolution of AMEX Internet index over the two sample periods. Schwert(2002) shows the unusual increase in Nasdaq volatility in the post June 1998 period. Based on all this evidence, we analyze our sample separately for the pre and post June 98 sample periods.
Figure 2 graphically shows the changes in abnormal volatility around the event date. We compute the monthly λ of each stock (using daily returns) for 24 months before and after the event. Individual λs in each month were then averaged cross-sectionally in the event time.
The time-series of average λ are plotted in Figure 2 . The notable result is the spike in λ at the event date, which can be seen in Figure 2 (A). This again confirms our results in Table   II that the event is associated with a surge in volatility. The corresponding graphs for two sub-samples and the results are in Figure 2 (B) and 2(C). These figures confirm that firms which moved online prior to June 1998 did not experience a volatility increase, in marked contrast to firms that moved online post June 1998. Next, we use the methodology of Bai, Lumisdaine and Stock (1998) to detect a structural break in the average firm volatility series. The volatility of a stock is computed as the 12-month rolling sample standard deviation of monthly returns following Officer (1973) and Merton (1980) . The average volatility series is constructed by taking the cross-sectional average of stock volatilities in event time. The average volatility series for the full, pre-June 1998 and post-June 1998 samples are shown in Figures 3(A) ,(B) and (C) respectively. The pattern here is similar to the one seen in Figure 2 with the λ series. In the overall sample, we observe a surge in volatility at event date, which is caused solely by the events after June 1998. The formal test for structural break using a Wald statistic confirms this result (Table   III) . Figure 3 (D) ,(E) and (F) show the time series of the Wald statistic for the full sample, 13 c Robert H. Zakon, adapted with permission from http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/ pre-June 1998 sample and post-June 1998 sample respectively. In the overall sample, as in the post-June 1998 sample, we see a sharp rise in the Wald statistic around the event date.
The 1% confidence band of the break date is around the event date and is quite narrow, covering a period of only about 3 months and includes the event date (month 0) for the full sample and the post-98 sample. This is very clear evidence of a break around the event date for the average volatility series. It can be seen that the pre-1998 sample shows a structural break in average volatility 3 months before the event and thus, does not have any change in volatility associated with the event. This analysis confirms the above event study results.
It is possible that our sample of firm experience increases in volatility for reasons unrelated to their launch of eCommerce operations and our tests detect just these increases. In other words, the volatility increase and the event of moving online could both be jointly caused by other unobservable factors. To rule out this possibility, we repeat the volatility analysis in a matched sample of firms.
We construct a return-matched sample of firms as follows. For each firm in the test sample, we find a matched firm satisfying two criteria viz., (a) it is in the same NYSE market capitalization decile as the firm in the test sample and (b) in this size decile, it is the firm which has a compounded return in the two years prior to the event date which is the closest to that of the test firm. This methodology closely follows that recommended by Barber and Lyon (1996) . If the matching firm thus selected is found in our sample or if it is a 'pure Internet' firm or has operations in an Internet-related domain, we select the next-best match. Size and past returns are well known to be among the most important influences on the volatility of individual stocks (see, Duffee, 1995) . Thus, a control by size and past returns should be able to account for volatility changes not related to the event under consideration.
We also construct a volatility-matched sample of firms as follows. For each firm in the test sample, we find a matched firm which satisfies two criteria viz., (a) it is in the same NYSE market capitalization decile as the firm in the test sample and (b) in this size decile, it is the firm which has a natural logarithm of the ratio of the sample standard deviation for year -1 in event time to the sample standard deviation for year -2 (where 1 year consists of 250 trading days) that is the closest to that of the test firm. If the matching firm is found to be in our sample or if it is a 'pure Internet' firm or has operations in an Internet-related domain, we select the next-best match as earlier.
The results of the above analysis for the matched sample of firms appear in figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 depicts the monthly average λs for the return and volatility matched samples. No spike in average λ is seen at the event date for these two samples either in the pre-98 or the post-98 period. Figure 3 confirms this pattern by constructing a rolling volatility series, even though the general level of volatility is higher in the post-event period than in the pre-event period for all the 3 samples. 14 .
The contrasting results found with our test sample of firms and the matched sample confirm that the volatility surge around the event cannot be attributed to other well known determinants of stock return volatility viz. past returns, past volatility run up and firm size.
Since we have already omitted other firm specific announcements and events which could have a confounding effect on the stock volatility, we conclude that the observed surge in volatility can be attributed solely to the commencement of eCommerce operations. We now proceed using the HS methodology to confirm our above findings.
Event Induced Unsystematic Volatility-Results
The results for this analysis are summarized in Figures IV (A) ,(B) and (C), which show the estimated cumulative abnormal volatility Cλ t over the event window for the test sample, return matched sample and the volatility matched sample. They also illustrate the cumulative abnormal volatility that would be expected under the null hypothesis of no event induced volatility, given the values of the parameter estimates. The same results are summarized in a tabular form in Table IV , which shows the values of abnormal volatility λ cumulative abnormal volatility Cλ for the event window. The event window covers the period [-26,+25] days around the event date. Figure IV(A) shows the results for the entire sample. First we note that the cumulative abnormal volatility drifts up (compared to its expected value under the null) for the test sample as well as for the two matched samples. This is also reflected clearly in Table IV(A).
Note that under the null hypotheses (8) and (9) above, the value of λ should be 1 on each day 14 The individual stock volatility has increased much more in recent years compared to the market volatility. See Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) for a detailed analysis.
and the value of Cλ should start at 1 on day -26 and increase by 1 for each day over the event window. The p-values of the test statistic for testing the null hypothesis (9) of no event effect on cumulative abnormal volatility is also reported. The null is resoundingly rejected for all the three samples on all days except day -26. This reflects that, in general, the idiosyncratic volatility of stocks has risen over time in the past few years. This is also consistent with the findings in Campbell et al.(2001) that the unsystematic volatility of individual stocks have risen over the last few decades.
Although all three samples show an increase in unsystematic volatility over time, the impact of the event is evident from figure IV(A) . The cumulative abnormal volatility surges significantly at the event date for the test sample only, but not for the two matched samples.
The deviation of the cumulative abnormal volatility from its value under null is also the maximum for the test sample. These results indicate that while the statistical tests proposed by HS show a significant increase in unsytematic volatility for all three samples on the event date, the event clearly has the strongest effect on unsystematic volatility for the test sample.
The test sample is then split into two -sample 1, consisting of firms with event dates prior to June 1998 and sample 2 consisting of firms with event dates after June 1998. The results for these 2 samples are shown in Figures IV(B) and IV(C)respectively 15 and also in Panels (B) and (C) of Table IV . We find in sample 1, that the event had no effect on the unsystematic volatility a result that confirms our earlier analysis. The entire effect that we observe for the full sample is due to sample 2. Table V suggest that all three samples in our study had statistically significant and the same order of magnitude increases 15 In the estimation, we dropped the firms whose volatility process parameters showed the presence of non-stationarities. Hence, the number of firms are unequal across the samples.
Additional Tests for Robustness
in their trading activity measures over time, whether measured as volume or number of transactions, while their volatility experience as noted above, was very different. We therefore conclude that increases in trading activity cannot be an explanation for increases in volatility in our eCommerce sample.
Finally, as corroborative evidence, following Schwert(1990) we track the monthly series of implied volatility of at-the-money call options for firms in our eCommerce sample over a period of 4 years around our event date. We obtain the data from the Optionmetrics database. Many studies have shown that close-to-the-money option prices convey the most information about the expectations of the options market concerning future volatility (Day and Lewis, 1988) . The results are presented in Table VI and figure 5. We find that implied volatility increased for our eCommerce sample after the event of moving online, confirming our earlier results. This increase is statistically significant at the 5% level or higher.
We also provide additional evidence for higher demand uncertainty relating to the Internet and more specifically to eCommerce. In addition to earlier discussions, the evidence that eCommerce activity is associated with a higher uncertainty in product demand comes from several sources. First, the US Census Bureau data of Internet-retail sales versus overall retail sales are reproduced in Table VII , Panel A . These data show that Internet sales have been far more volatile compared to traditional sales. The coefficient of variation was 22.7% for Web-sales and only 5.6% for the total retail sales 16 . Table VII, Panel B shows the changes in annual sales (both total retail sales as well as eCommerce sales) across different sectors. On an average, Internet-driven sales rose by 89% between 1999 and 2000, compared to a 7.1% increase in overall sales for the same time period. In addition, we also find that the agencies which forecast eCommerce activity (such as online advertising spending by US firms) have widely different views about eCommerce, reflecting the inherent uncertainties. Table VII 17 . Taken together, panels A-C of table VII suggest that eCommerce activity is associated with a higher demand uncertainty compared to traditional retail channels.
Finally we attempt to relate demand uncertainty in the product markets to stock return volatility. Ideally we would like to construct a measure of demand uncertainty using quarterly sales data before and after the introduction of eCommerce operations (using eCommerce sales in the latter period) and relate it to the increase in stock return volatility. Due to data limitations we are unable to obtain a long enough time series of sales after the adoption of eCommerce operations at the firm level to undertake this test. Thus we adopt an alternative approach and show that the measures of demand uncertainty we construct are positively related to stock return volatility. This evidence taken together with the evidence from Table VII suggests that the increased demand uncertainty due to introduction of eCommerce operations is associated with increases in stock return volatility.
We use quarterly sales data for firms in our sample for the period 1990-2002 from COM-PUSTAT (data item 2) to measure demand uncertainty. We posit an AR(1) process to estimate quarterly sales for each firm in our sample. For each firm the following AR (1) process for quarterly sales is estimated.
ln(Sales(i, t))
where Sales (i,t) refers to quarterly sales for firm i in quarter t. The measure of demand uncertainty for firm i, U N C 1i is the time-series standard deviation of residuals it from the above specification. In the second stage a cross sectional regression is run between λ i and U N C 1i as follows 18 .
We also calculate another measure of demand uncertainty U N C 2i . The calculation of U N C 2i follows exactly the same procedure as before except that the AR(1) specification in the first 17 Source : www.eMarketer.com 18 λ i is calculated for each firm for eight years around the event date, corresponding roughly to the same period for which AR(1) process is estimated using daily returns. Note that this definition of lambda is different from the definition used in the rest of the tables.
stage is estimated without a constant term for each firm. For the regression White (1980) corrected standard errors are reported. 
Volatility and Abnormal Returns
While the focus of this paper is on examining the impact of firms' adoption of eCommerce on their stock price volatility, a natural question that arises is the impact of the event on firms' stock returns. To this end, we perform a traditional return-event study using a market-model and a value-weighted index, ensuring to correct for non-synchronous trading using Scholes William beta as well as for increases in event-induced variance using the method of Boehmer et al. (1991) . The results of the event-study are provided in Table IX . Panel A presents the event study results for the full sample of 164 firms, for four different event windows, while Panel B and C present the results for the pre-1998 sample and post-1998 sample of firms, respectively. As illustrated in Table IX , it can be seen that while firms experience a positive abnormal return on moving online, these abnormal returns are more pronounced for firms that moved online post-June 1998, compared to firms that moved online prior to June 1998. These findings parallel those of our volatility study and suggest a positive relationship between firm-specific idiosyncratic volatility and abnormal returns. This is particularly interesting in light of the recent findings by Duffee (2002) who finds a significant positive contemporaneous relation between stock returns and firm-level idiosyncratic volatility; this positive relationship being stronger for firms with higher betas and book-to-market ratios. Duffee (2002) theorizes that shocks to firm value are caused by shocks to asset values, with riskier assets having larger absolute shocks -a positive (negative) shock to firm value being accompanied by an increase (decrease) in the value of the firm's risky assets leading to higher idiosyncratic volatility. In our study, the onset of eCommerce can be considered to be an exogenous event that is shown to increase both the value of the firm (based on the results of the return event study) and its idiosyncratic volatility -findings that reinforce Duffee's (2002) arguments.
Conclusions
In this paper, we study the effect of real activity with in the firm on its stock return volatility.
Specifically, we focus on the impact of traditional firms' adoption of eCommerce on the volatility of their stock returns. We find that stock return volatility increases when the traditional firms announce eCommerce initiatives. This increase in firm-level volatility is detected using three different methodologies and similar abnormal volatility is absent in samples of firms matched with the test sample. We corroborate this evidence by studying the implied volatility of at-the-money call options of our test sample which are also found to increase around the event date. More importantly, we find that the market's perception of the significance of the Internet for traditional firms plays a very important role in determining the impact of the event on risk-return profile of firms. Only firms that moved online postJune 1998, the period when Internet-related activity reached critical mass, experience a significant surge in volatility, an effect that is absent for firms that moved online prior to June 1998. This coincides with the findings by Schwert (2002) , of an increase in market volatility of 'technology-intensive' firms after mid-1998. The adoption of the Internet for commerce constitutes a significant change in a traditional firm's technological environment. We find that the consequence of these developments is increased turbulence in firms' product markets as reflected in a higher demand uncertainty, leading to higher volatility of firm's stock returns.
We also find that the behavior of event-induced positive abnormal returns closely parallels that of the event-induced volatility increase and suggests a positive relationship between the two. Further research would be required to examine the contemporaneous relationship between abnormal returns and volatility increases and to identify factors that moderate the strength of this relationship. Overall, our results show strong evidence of the impact of real activity within the firm on its stock return volatility and highlight the need for a better understanding of the financial impacts of firms' changes in technological environment and product market initiatives. 
Appendix A : A Simple Model of Demand Uncertainty
We begin with the premise that a firm faces a more uncertain product market demand online than in traditional retailing. The objective of this simple model is to show that such an uncertainty in the product market can lead to a higher volatility of profits.
The firm faces a stochastically varying inverse demand process θ t in the product market, which is modeled as a diffusion process in continuous time. It maximizes the profit function π = (θ − Q)Q, where Q is the quantity sold. The optimal profit for a monopoly firm are
. We can express its evolution as a Geometric Brownian Motion, i.e.
so that,
Thus, expected profit is,π
and variance of the profit can be shown to be,
Now consider the same firm with eCommerce operations. We postulate two changes to occur when the firm moves online viz.
(1) there is a fixed setup cost I and (2) the demand function becomes more uncertain, which is captured by a stochastically evolving multiplier γ. The firm therefore maximizes the objective function γ(θ − Q)Q − I and the maximized profit process is π 2 = γx − I. The evolution of γ is assumed to be given by the process,
where corr(B t , W t ) = 0.
This implies that,
The expected profit and the variance of profits can be calculated as follows:
The ratio of the variances in the two cases is,
This ratio is always greater than or equal to 1. Thus, the twin effects of higher demand uncertainty and lower fixed cost of entry implies that the introduction of online operations by a firm would always lead to an increase in the volatility of firm's profit or net cash flow each period. This will translate into a higher equity price volatility as well.
Appendix B : Structural Break Analysis
Under our null hypothesis, the event has no effect on the volatility σ, i.e. the process generating the time-series of σ remains structurally unchanged. Under the alternative hypothesis of event-induced abnormal volatility, the process generating σ t time series will have a structural break at the event date. Banerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1992) (BLS1) and Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1998) (BLS2) provide an approach for detecting such a break. They show (i) that tests can be constructed to determine the occurrence of structural break in a set of time-series data, and (ii) that confidence intervals can be computed enabling inference about the break date. They demonstrate this for both stationary vector autoregressions and cointegrated systems. This paper focuses on the stationary case.
BLS2 postulate the following general form of regression relationship among dependent variable y and vector of independent variables X (equation 2.2 from BLS2):
where y t is n by 1, G t is a row vector containing a constant, lags of y t , and row t of the matrix of exogenous regressors, X, I n is an n by n identity matrix, d t (k) = 0 for t < k and d t (k) = 1 for t >= k. θ and δ are parameter vectors with dimension r. For example, for a first-order vector autoregression with a vector of constants µ and parameter matrix A, More compactly,
If we let R = (0, I) be the selection matrix associated with β, so that Rβ = Sδ and Σ is the covariance matrix of the errors t , then the F-statistic testing Sδ = 0 is
where β(k) and Σ(k) denote the estimators of β and Σ, respectively, evaluated at k, obtained as described above. BLS2 show that F T (k) converges in distribution via the functional central limit theorem to F * , where
where · represents the Euclidean norm and now W (.) is a vector of independent standard Brownian motion processes whose dimension is equal to q, the rank of S. The corresponding distribution can be approximated by partial sums of normal random variables for each dimension. We use the table with corresponding critical values for the rank up to q = 50 as given in the appendix of Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine(2002) . By the continuous mapping theorem, the limiting distribution of max k F T (k) converges to max F * . As noted above, we focus on this test statistic in the empirical work.
The dimension of the test statistic increases with both the dimensionality of the system and with the number of regressors in the model whose coefficients are allowed to break. As an example, consider an n by 1 VAR. If the order of the VAR is p and we allow for a break in all of the coefficients, the relevant dimension of the F-statistic will be n(np + 1).
To conduct inference about the break date, theorem 4 of BLS2 shows that
where V * has limiting density given by equation below (to be filled) and Q = plim
Similarly, we can invert the limiting distribution to construct confidence intervals for the estimated break date, based on allowing any or all of the coefficients to experience a break.
The confidence interval is
where Q = and the alternative of a breaking mean, respectively. In addition, simulations regarding confidence intervals confirm that, for fixed parameters, increasing the sample will not affect the precision of the MLE of k 0 but increasing the number of series that experience the same break does improve precision. In addition, this precision depends on the true value of the break magnitude. 
Equity return volatility is computed as the 12 month rolling volatility following Officer(1973 )and Merton (1980 . The median column in the table shows the estimated break datek in event time for the time series of average monthly volatility for the corresponding sample. Break dates are estimated using the Wald Statistic F described in Appendix B. We test the null hypothesis that the post-break coefficient changes are not significantly different from zero, i.e., that no break occurred in the sample period by comparing the maximum value in the estimated time series F(k) to the 5% quantile of its limiting distribution. The null hypothesis is rejected when the maximum value for F(k), reported in the Max-Wald column of the table is higher than the critical value for the selected significance level. We use the critical values from Bekaert et.al (2002) , Table   10 in the Appendix who approximate the limiting distribution of the F process with partial sums of normal random variables for each possible dimension of the test statistic which is the dimension of S. From that table
we use the asymptotic 1% critical value of 11.81 corresponding to a rank of 1 for vector S. the 2.5 th and the 97.5 th percentile columns display the estimated lower and upper bands respectively for the confidence intervals for the "true break dates" as per equation (23) Where Sales (i,t) refers to quarterly sales for firm i in quarter t. The measure of demand uncertainty for firm i, U N C 1i is the time series standard deviation of residuals it from the above specification. In the second stage, a cross sectional regression is run between λ i and U N C 1i as follows
λi is calculated for each firm for the same period for which AR (1) Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen, (1991) .The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively, using a 1-tail test. The Hobbes' Internet Timeline and the Amex Internet Index
The top panel ( Figure 1A ) of this figure shows that the growth rate of number of Websites, which was approximately linear till about June 1998, became exponential in the later period.
This shows that the importance and size of the Internet, as measured by this metric increased dramatically after this date. The bottom panel ( Figure 1B ) of this figure shows the evolution of AMEX internet index in periods corresponding to Pre and Post June 1998. Copyright :
BigCharts.com. period. Market volatility is computed using the return on the equally weighted index. These ratios are then averaged across firms in the event time. The panels show the average ratios for the net sample (Firms that moved online) and the same ratios for 2 samples in which each net sample firm is matched to a corresponding firm by size and 2 year past return (return sample) and size and 2 year past volatility (volatility sample). Pre98 and Post98 samples are firms that moved online before and after June 1998 respectively. Figure 5 Implied Volatility from the options market
This figure shows the behavior of the average monthly implied volatility of at the money call options for the firms that moved online, and for which data is available. This is plotted for 4 years around the event date. The graph also shows the number of firms in each month for which options data was available.
